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I’m sending this one out to everybody that’s had to wait on a money
transfer…
You know how good it feels when they say:
You can pick it up today, it’s fifteen minutes away…
Feels like an angel’s beacon, I can hardly believe it…
I got my biz in order, I made it cross the border
‘Such dazzle such a horror, his life is like an opera’
I haven’t gone astray, don’t drink or smoke or sway
Though sometimes I don’t pray, it feels so good to say
Go out and receive it, cause I just know you need it
Your boy has grown up decent, Grandma can you believe it
You can pick it up today, it’s fifteen minutes away…
I just want to give a quick shout out to all those people who’ve helped
me along the way…
Now I’m sending money to people.
Generosity is the key…
K’Naan, “15 Minutes Away”
Sometimes I shout at them…‘Do you think we are collecting the money
from the trees?’…But they won’t understand. I told myself, when I left
Somalia, when I looked down from the plane, I said ‘I never ever want
to come back here!’ After one week I wanted to go back!…They have
no minimum clue the position you’re in, how much pressure you’re
under…They wake up in the morning and they don’t know where to get
breakfast. That is the life they are dealing with…If they are lucky they
got your phone number, so they call you hoping you can help.
Interview with Shamsa in London, May 20051

These views neatly capture the ambiguous feelings that soon become
apparent when asking Somali Londoners about sending money
“home.” A relative minority of the Somali regions’ so-called “missing
million” have settled in the Global North, but they provide the bulk
of remittance funds. A key node in global trade and finance, London
has also witnessed “globalisation from below”: by the beginning of the
21st century over one third of the workforce was born abroad.2 While
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the dynamics and impact of immigration and asylum in London are
relatively well-recorded and well-researched, the fact that London is
also a key source of remittances for poorer countries has only come
to the attention of researchers and policymakers in recent years. The
World Bank in 2008 suggested that migrants in the U.K. sent official
remittances amounting to some $4.5 billion in 2006.
The “new economics of labour migration” represents the only systematic and detailed attempt to theorise remittance behaviour. It contends that migration is a household-level response to constraints in
local credit, insurance, or other markets.3 Deciding whether a household member should migrate involved weighing the costs of migration (such as foregone family agricultural labour and travel expenses)
against the anticipated benefits (such as remittances). In this way, remittances became central to migration decisions, reflecting an implicit
contract between the migrant and those left behind—underwritten by
altruism, self-interest, mutual insurance motives, or loan repayment
obligations. This model fits the realities of voluntary, temporary, most
likely male migration from cohesive households in rural Mexican communities, which have provided much of the empirical material for
theory-making particularly well, but seems to have less purchase in
other contexts.4
This article examines why Somali Londoners send money and the
effects that this has on their lives. Although quantitative testing of
classic hypotheses relating to remittance behaviour has not been possible based on the data available, analysis of the Somali remittance
process raises several issues that would be worth exploring in future
studies. In particular it explores the implications of the violent origins
of migration for the remittance process and the social texture of these
transfers. By investigating the migration and remittance experiences
of people of Somali origin in London, it also addresses an important
gap, because remittance literature has been primarily concerned with
understanding the economic effects of labour migration and remitting
on recipient households, regions, and countries, while neglecting the
disaporic perspective.
This article draws on informal consultations, some thirty interviews,
and a survey of 175 remitters in a London money-transfer office belonging to Dahabshiil Company.5 Although not a statistically representative
sample of remitters in London, the information that respondents provided gives a broadly indicative picture of remittance patterns. While
every host context is different, many of the findings from London are

40

Anna Lindley

echoed in evidence from elsewhere in the Somali diaspora, and indeed
among other refugee groups, as we will see. This article first explores
the particular history of Somali migration to the U.K., then considers
the widespread engagement of Somali Londoners in the remittance
process, exploring who is sending money, the social micro-dynamics
underlying remittance relationships, and the repercussions of remitting in their lives.
I. Seeking Asylum and Settling in a Global City
While the first Somali seamen working in the U.K. for the Merchant
Navy were viewed by their communities as intrepid adventurers—
tacaabir—since the late 1980s people have come to the U.K. on an adventure not of their own choosing, as refugees. Some came directly; others
after a period in refugee camps and cities in neighbouring countries or
the Middle East; some ended up in the U.K. as a result of a smuggling
process in which they exercised little control. Many made circuitous
journeys in search of safety and rights. As the U.K. tightened its policy
toward asylum-seekers, it became difficult to claim asylum without
false documents, and social networks became particularly crucial in
providing information, money, and assistance on arrival. The experiences of the refugees interviewed provide a contrast with some of the
more upbeat literature on processes of globalisation and migration:
[D]ifferent social groups and different individuals are placed in very
distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections… . some
people are more in charge of it than others: some initiate flows and
movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than
others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.6

Many Somali people coming to the U.K. were recognised as refugees and subsequently became citizens while others gained some form
of subsidiary protection. An unknown number are failed asylum-seekers, are homeless and/or rely on support from NGOs, local councils, or
relatives. Some close family members of people permanently settled in
the U.K. were able to apply for family reunion. Finally, there is some
relocation of Somali EU citizens from other EU countries to the U.K.,
particularly from the Netherlands and Scandinavia.7
It is hard to know the exact numbers but it seems likely that there
are well over 71,000 people who were born in Somalia8 and now live in
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the U.K. The ethnic population, including European-born children and
Ethiopian and Kenyan Somalis, must be much larger. The process of
migration dramatically reconfigured conventional pre-war economic
roles in many diasporic households, with women often taking a more
prominent role in decision-making and income-generation in London.
The emotional and economic strains of displacement and settlement
have often led to marital breakdown, and there are widespread concerns about excessive qaat usage among men. A plethora of Somali
community support organisations have been established, many surviving on only meagre funds and the energy and dedication of volunteers,
but they come under heavy criticism for their often clan-based nature.
This demonstrates the gulf between the ways that the host state’s multicultural model, requiring devolution of responsibility to cohesive ethnic communities in ways shaped by the experience of Empire, and the
complex, tense, transnational social worlds in which Somalis arriving
in the U.K. often find themselves.9
Economic indicators have been poor. According to the 2001 Census,
only around 16% of Somali-born people in London of working age
were officially employed—the lowest rate of all foreign-born groups.10
Somali-born people were employed in diverse industries: particularly
wholesale and retail trade; real estate, rental, and business activities;
and health and social work. There are no major labour market niches
as with some immigrant groups, although anecdotally, there are a
handful of very specific niches where Somalis work in larger numbers: community workers, taxi drivers, bus drivers, cleaners at Victoria station, and workers at Heathrow Airport. Labour market barriers
include language skills, immigration status, racism and discrimination,
poor literacy, and problems with converting professional qualifications
gained elsewhere.11 At the same time, some people have established
successful businesses, particularly money transfer agencies, Internet
and telecommunications bureaus, taxi firms, and restaurants and cafes
serving Somali food, following the classic immigrant pathways into
self-employment. Many Somali Europeans relocating to the U.K. cite
the more promising business environment as a major pull factor, and
there are suggestions that over time the economic integration of people
of Somali origin, while still a matter of concern, may be improving.
London is the hub of a wide range of transnational activities. It
has been a destination for exiled politicians from all over the Somali
regions and a source of political and military fundraising. Many community associations are also involved in fundraising for schools and
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other community projects in the Somali regions. There is a constant
exchange of information between London and the Horn of Africa
through phone calls, email, chat rooms, Somali language newspapers,
online news, and visits by prominent people. Some people spend parts
of the year in the more stable northern Somali regions, as “revolving
returnees,” effectively forming a “part-time disapora.”12 Summer visits allow people to spend time with their families, show the children
“their culture,” and in some cases oversee house building or investigate business opportunities. Amid these various types of transnational
exchange, there is the constant rhythm of remittances leaving London
for the Horn of Africa.
II. Who Pays the Bill?
It is not known exactly what proportion of Somali people in the U.K.
send remittances. Many people expansively claim that, “Everyone
sends money.” But of course, some people do not. The desire to engage
in transnational activities is influenced by various factors and is not
always matched by the capability to do so; conversely, some people
who are capable of sending money do not wish to.13 However, most
people whom I asked during the course of the research said they had
remitted some money in the previous year, even if only an ad hoc,
small amount.
The remitter survey results regarding amounts transferred during the last twelve months are shown in Table 1. The first and most
important type were remittances to personal contacts in Somalia or
elsewhere, which averaged around $3,110 per year ($260 a month).14
Many people also made transfers for investment or community-related
activities in Somalia, bringing total average transfers to around $4,440
per year, although amounts tended to cluster in the lower ranges.15
Remittance patterns varied: in this sample, 61% remitted to at least one
individual on a monthly basis, although many remitted less frequently
and some only on an ad-hoc basis for specific projects or urgent needs.
Figure 1 shows the gender and age distribution of respondents.
Around three fifths were men, two fifths were women, and most remitters of both sexes were aged 25–44.16 The average household size was
3.4: around a quarter lived alone (mainly men); two fifths lived with
children under 16; and around one third lived with a spouse. The
vast majority of the remitters surveyed were born in Somalia, most
left since the conflict began, and nearly all had citizenship or refugee
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Table 1. Remittances and Other Transfers
Number of cases
Remittances to
persona contacts
Investment transfers
(Somali regions)
Community contributions
(Somali regions)
Total

Minimum
(US$)

Maximum
(US$)

Mean
(US$)

Median
(US$)

Before

171

50

22,550

3,108

2,250

21

19

50,000

990

0

113
175

10
50

8,756
52,400

341
4,438

74
2,493

Source: Remitter Survey June 2005.
Notes: Data for the twelve months leading up to the survey. Due to time constraints
respondents were not asked about investments or community contributions
outside Somalia. Averages calculated over whole sample.

or temporary status. Economic activities varied. Figure 2 shows that
56% of working age respondents were working, 12% were looking for
work, and 14% were occupied looking after their home and family.
People were employed in health, social services and the voluntary sector, public and private transport, warehouse/factory labor, and security. Only a handful was self-employed. The sample fell into four crude
household income groups. Around 30% worked and one or more other
household member(s) also worked. Around 20% worked but were the
only household member doing so. Around 30% were not working but
someone else in their household did. The remaining 20% or so lived in
households with no apparent source of earned income, probably relying on state benefits.
To calculate the determinants of the likelihood and level of remitting, it would be necessary to take a random sample from the migrant
population and analyse the characteristics of those who remit and
those who do not. However, some useful insights were gained from
comparing the remitter sample with Census data.17 In demographic
terms, for example, Figure 1 showed that remitters were more likely to
be aged 25–44 than was the general Somali-born population. It is sometimes said that women are “better” remitters than men. In our sample,
however, there was a greater proportion of men than in the general
Somali-born population and male respondents sent larger remittances
on average ($3,645), although women still sent considerable sums
($2,340). It would seem that there has been a significant relative rather
than an absolute change. Men dominate as senders, but women play a
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Figure 1. Remitters and Somali-Born Population by Gender and Age
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 and Census 2001 England and Wales.

Figure 2. Remitters and Somali-Born Population by Economic Profile
Source: Remitter Survey June 2005 and Census 2001 England and Wales.

considerable minority role, widely noted because it runs counter to the
traditional culture.
Turning to economic characteristics, the evidence suggests that,
unsurprisingly, the economic situation affects remittances. Figure 2
shows that the remitters surveyed had higher (by over three times)
employment rates than the general Somali-born population. More-
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over, workers sent approximately three times larger amounts than
non-workers. Remitters in multiple income households sent the most,
followed by those in single income households in which the remitter
worked.
III. The Social Micro-Dynamics of Remittances
Conventional micro-economic approaches to studying remittances
can be dismissive of people’s own (subjective) explanations for their
actions, focusing rather on measuring their behaviour and extrapolating explanations. However, insights from economic anthropology and
sociology point to how economic actions are intricately embedded
in social relations. They suggest that, particularly in more traditional
societies:
[A] material transaction is usually a momentary episode in a continuous
social relation. The social relation exerts governance: the flow of goods is
constrained by, is part of, a status etiquette…Yet the connection between
material flow and social relations is reciprocal…If friends make gifts,
gifts make friends…the material flow underwrites social relations.18

It follows that to explain remitting, we have to not only explore
how people act, but also the meanings that they attach to these actions.
Remittance practices vary and may carry rather different meanings in
different cultural settings. For example, Cliggett outlines how Zambian
rural-urban migrants make social investments through intermittent
gifts in-kind in the expectation of being welcomed on their return.19
Bajic describes the proud resistance among middle-class urban Serbian parents, despite their worsening economic situation, to receiving
remittances from their migrant children.20
What are the social micro-dynamics of remitting in the Somali case?
Farhiya’s experience is illustrative. As a working woman who came to
the U.K. many years ago, with three children, Farhiya has continued to
support her family over a long period of time. Her husband also works
and both have siblings in Somalia whom they separately support. Sorting through the receipts, which she had begun to retain and store in a
box couple of years earlier, showed the complexity of remittance patterns. In total she sent more than $5,000 in the previous year, which
was not an unusual amount for Somali Londoner to remit. First, she
was supporting the family of her oldest brother in Somalia. He is an
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elder and was once well off, but his business collapsed during the war.
She felt that she owed him because he played a key role in her upbringing. After arriving in the U.K., she sent money now and again, but then
he asked her for more regular support, initially on a temporary basis.
This somehow became a permanent arrangement and, for some years,
Farhiya sent $100 each month to her sister-in-law for general household needs. Her brother sometimes asked—directly or indirectly—for
extra help. One day he asked her to send the money for one year in
advance so they could start a small business. She agreed, on the basis
that once the business was set up, they would support themselves.
With difficulty, for two years Farhiya sent larger instalments, but, as
no successful business emerged and with no clear explanation for why
not, she told them she would go back to sending $100 each month.
Second, a few years ago, Farhiya decided to send her half-brother to
Nairobi. He was a bright young man with a reputation of being hard
working. Farhiya wanted him to study “something useful”—perhaps
computers, Swahili, or English—and was considering trying to bring
him to the U.K. She sent money for his expenses, but then found out
that he was spending his time chewing qaat. She threatened to stop
if he did not pull his act together, and said each month she would
send $50 to him for rent and $50 to their cousin to cook his meals. He
was angry that she had asked around about him, and went to live in
a remote refugee camp where she did not know anyone. When we
spoke, she told me that he sometimes phones and she still is sometimes persuaded to send him some money, but she does not send on a
monthly basis anymore.
Lastly, she sometimes helped another brother in town and her
nomadic sisters. Yet another sister lives in London but has been back
a few times, trying to arrange visas for her children. When she goes
back, occasionally she asks for help or relays others’ requests. Farhiya
also sometimes remits money to extended family members and contributes to qadhaan (clan-based collections) for individuals and social
projects in their hometown.
Many remitters interviewed, like Farhiya, expressed feelings of
indebtedness to their parents, and often older brothers or uncles, for
earlier material and non-material assistance, particularly for bringing
them up, helping with their education, and sometimes for paying for
them to go overseas. The most common beneficiaries of the Somali
Londoners surveyed were siblings and parents (71%).21 Spouses were
less common recipients (9% of regular recipients, as many Somali cou-
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ples were split by death, separation, or divorce, and many others were
reunited or were married overseas) although predictably had a strong
claim for assistance, receiving the highest average amount. People also
sent money to other family members and friends, who accounted for
17% of the regular recipients and 12% of the volume.
However, in most cases where people expressed a sense of debt, it
was rather diffuse and indefinite, resonating with the anthropological concept of generalised reciprocity typical among kin, involving no
overt reckoning of debts, where returns may be much delayed and not
necessarily equivalent in form or measure to what has been given (as
distinct from balanced reciprocity, in which returns of commensurate
worth are anticipated).22 For example, Liban, a community worker,
rationalised his own situation of supporting four uncles regularly and
twelve aunts intermittently by saying, “You eat with your brother
when he has money.”23 Also, debts were often transferable within family networks. If a man was assisted by an older uncle to migrate to
the U.K., for instance, he might return the favour by paying a cousin’s
school fees.
People explained that sending money was a way to maintain affectionate relationships in the absence of other regular forms of faceto-face interaction, which usually reinforces family relations. This
resonates with evidence from Zambia, where sending gifts has been
described as a way to “remember” or “recognise” people, and from
El Salvador where people are said to “measure affection” in remittances.24 For many Somalis in the U.K., sending remittances became
a critical factor in maintaining a sense of familial harmony and well
being. Such non-material returns for remitting can play a key—and
as yet under-theorised—role in motivating remittances, a role which
is hard to capture using survey methods. In some cases, in the back of
their minds people were also preserving the possibility of eventually
returning in dignity to the Somali region. In the shorter term, some
anticipated that if they did wish to visit their home area, they could
count on their family providing hospitality and security.
The global infrastructure of telecommunications, travel, and money
transfer plays a key role in mediating the remittance process. As one
money transfer agent pointed out, “If you have a call every morning from a family member, then you are going to send money.”25 It
is relatively easy to send money from the U.K. to the Somali regions
because the U.K. has had one of the more liberal regimes for regulating
money transmission. The fact that fees on small amounts are reason-
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ably affordable means that people are sending money on a monthly
basis, and in some cases more frequently. These infrastructures are
well developed and relatively competitive in the Somali regions (in
sharp contrast to some other conflict-affected settings). It brings the
lives of those overseas closer to those “back home,” and makes the
whole remittance system more responsive to events.
In this context, considerable social pressure can be applied. Many
Somalis would be shamed if they did not support their relatives:
one survey respondent said he would be “struck off the family list.”
Farhiya, like many others, said that if she stopped sending money
to her brother, it would not only sour her relationship with him, but
people in their hometown would also notice and say that she forgot
her family. People in the community in the U.K. might also give her
a hard time. Given the importance of diaspora networks for many
refugees—for social contact, financial assistance, information, and help
navigating life in the U.K.—adverse gossip can have genuine repercussions on people’s lives.
Material need and economic disparities were another recurrent
theme in people’s explanations. Interviewees emphasised the poverty
and insecurity of many Somalis in Africa. Farhiya talked of the “misery” in her home community: some of the extended family sometimes
ate only once a day. Either directly or through other people, many
Somalis in the U.K. are constantly hearing sad stories of their relatives’ desperate or dangerous situations. Abdirashid, from Mogadishu,
spoke of his sense of responsibility:
If we don’t send money to Somalia, people they don’t survive…the children, if they don’t go to school, they become militia, simple!…If someone
called me today and says my child cannot go to school because I don’t
have money for the school fees, I should feel guilty, if I have got money
and someone told me that. Someone to die, or maybe 10p [for school
fees], yeah?26

It is not just about absolute need, it is also about the disparity
between the relative positions of sender and recipient. This fits with
the theory that within relationships characterised by generalised reciprocity,
The greater the wealth gap…the greater the demonstrable assistance
from rich to poor that is necessary just to maintain a degree of sociability…the inclination toward generalized exchange deepens where the
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economic gap amounts to oversupply and undersupply of customary
requirements and, especially, of urgent stuff.27

A “global city” in the heart of the First World, London provides
a clear contrast with the country of origin. People commented that
relatives in Africa think that dadka dibadaha (“people outside”) are
rich, seeing incoming remittances (often substantial amounts by local
standards) as proof. There are concrete facts: Table 2 reveals some of
the starkest disparities in a world of uneven development. Clearly,
relatively small amounts by U.K. standards can go a long way in the
Somali regions. Between $50 and $200 a month, for example, can provide for an entire family, depending on size and location. Many people
in the Global North are able to send monthly amounts that can meet all
the needs of a family in the Somali regions. Sometimes they can afford
to make substantial investments. Even people who are quite poor may
be able to play an important role in relatives’ livelihoods, and it can
be hard to justify withdrawing that support. In this context, one-way
flows may continue for long periods.
However, there is evidence of some mutual re-evaluation. On one
hand, recipients are aware of some of the problems people face overseas, and some people try to impress these on them during visits and
phone calls. On the other hand, as some progress is made in Somaliland and elsewhere, some people are beginning to deconstruct the symbolic poverty and insecurity of their place of origin, pointing to the
relative affluence in the better-off segments of society. As one Hargeisa
resident put it, some people overseas who visit or see videos re-evaluate their “congested life,” penny-pinching in the tower blocks of the
cold Global North, with mounting electricity and phone bills. As we
shall see, even those who have both the desire and capability to remit
often find that doing so has important repercussions on life in the U.K.
Some people return to Somaliland or even relocate to Egypt, seeking a
more middle-class life.28
Table 2. Comparison of Human Development Indicators
Life expectancy at birth
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
Adult literacy rate
Primary school enrolment rate
Population on less than $1 per day (purchasing power parity)

UK
79 years
6
99%
99%
0%

Somalia
46 years
225
19%*
17%*
43%*

Source: UNDP (2006), except figures marked* from UNDP and World Bank (2003).
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IV. Economic Sacrifices and Strategies,
Social Reaffirmation and Tensions
Despite anecdotal evidence of migrants working long hours in several
jobs in order to send money, the effects of remitting on senders are
largely unresearched. The sparse qualitative studies that shed light
on the experiences of refugees sending remittances tend to emphasise the elements of political coercion and the burden that sending
money imposes on lives in the Global North.29 Interviews with people
of Somali origin in London suggest that remitting has several types of
effect on senders.
In economic terms, poverty may be reinforced by remitting. Without
data on remitters’ incomes,30 it is not possible to establish the proportion remitted. However, it is clear that many remitters are employed
in relatively low-paid jobs and are unlikely to have large amounts of
disposable income. According to Idil, some remitters “don’t live lives
because of it basically…Most of them, people who were working in
factories, doing manual hard work, long shifts, sending money, getting the lowest incomes. Their basic wage is not much and they send
to relatives.”31 As one woman put it, “When you get income support,
you can save fifty dollars per month.”32 People on low incomes often
economise drastically, buying cheap food and pooling resources with
people outside their household. When this is not enough, they borrow
money from banks and social contacts, and women pawn their gold.
Idil explained: “I have taken my jewellery to the pawnbrokers, and lost
it all…I don’t regret it, it’s only things…I don’t pay bills until I get the
red letters because I am always sending money!”33
Even some people relying on state support—for example, elderly
seamen relying on state pensions—send small amounts now and again.
The survey was undertaken in an inner-city area with relatively high
unemployment. Around 20% of remitters surveyed lived in households where there were no apparent sources of earned income, presumably relying on state allowances. The finding is surprising because
state allowances provide just enough money to live on in London.34
It is a small subgroup (35 people) in a small sample, and it is possible
that some respondents in fact did have other sources of income that
they did not want to mention. But remitting part of state allowances
raises interesting issues. This money is the means by which the state
ensures a minimal standard of living for its poor and their dependents.
Yet some people may quietly accept material poverty below this stan-
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dard in order to send small sums to loved ones in need overseas. As
Bryceson and Vuorela point out, for transnational families, “Imagining
a family means giving it a definition that may conflict with the nation
state’s definition of legitimate immigrant families.”35
The fact that many migrants remit from meagre incomes is by no
means unique to Somalis.36 Indeed, some have suggested that one reason that remittances remain relatively stable, even during economic
downturns in developed host states, is because of social protection systems.37 However, the implications are serious for those involved. Scraping together these funds by careful economising of minimal wages or
allowances pushes them further into poverty. There are also implications for the role remittances play in the country of origin: entrenched
poverty in the diaspora can prevent remitting or trap people in a cycle
of sending subsistence amounts, constraining remittance investments.
Related to the above, labour market, savings, and investment strategies may be affected by commitments to relatives, which make people
more willing to accept poorly paid manual work in unpleasant conditions, with long shifts at anti-social hours, and motivate people to find
work as soon as possible, when they might otherwise spend time training or seeking jobs more appropriate to their skills. The more strategic
development of remitters’ human capital through English language
and vocational training as well as secondary and higher education
might be curtailed. Many refugees arrived with few assets and have
not accumulated much financial capital. According to the 2001 Census,
only 7% of the Somali-born population owned their home and only 1%
were self-employed. These are low rates even compared with people
from other conflict-affected and African countries.38 Some remit most
of their earnings, or save it to help relatives emigrate, leaving little to
save or invest on their own behalf. The problems experienced by some
of the Somali remitters interviewed remind us that while social networks can be an important element in economic life and substantially
facilitate migration, they may also, in some instances, hinder migrants’
economic advancement by constraining accumulation.39 Meanwhile,
many people who do build up capital invest it in the Somali regions:
10% of survey respondents had invested in property there in the last
year. House prices vary and land disputes are common, but money
goes much further there than in London. There is both a practical and
a symbolic value of investing at home: a potential future return while
relatives may occupy the property or live off the rent.
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In social terms, as already indicated, remitting can be an important
source of familial and cultural reaffirmation. At individual and family levels, being able to support relatives can contribute to a sense of
well-being and make a painful separation seem more worthwhile. In
the wider cultural sense, interviewees expressed pride that Somalis
support their families, contrasting this solidarity with what they say
is a more fragmented and selfish culture in the U.K. and other countries they were familiar with. However, there are also social tensions
between senders and recipients. Some expressed an unease that money
always seems to creep in as an issue in relationships with people back
home. Some felt that recipients did not appreciate their hard work and
wasted the money. Shamsa’s brother remits regularly to their father
in Mogadishu, and Shamsa helps out now and again. She was rather
annoyed that this enabled her father to marry a younger wife and start
a new family: “My father is having plenty of children and he’s not even
taking a consideration…The more you make children, the more you
are rich. And the more he is rich, the more we are paying the price!”
Recipients are sometimes less than honest. According to Idil:
I have an aunt who had had all the diseases in the whole wide world!
She’s had diabetes, diarrhoea, blood pressure, cancer, heart and kidney
problems. I wouldn’t mind if she just said I don’t have anything to give
to my kids, she only has to say! [Once she phoned saying she had sight
problems]… I rang my mum in the US to say can you help her…My
mum said the woman has called me, she is building a house and she
needs the doors and the window!…People say anything to get money.40

A second downside is anxiety and stress.41 Given the ongoing insecurity in the Somali regions, many refugees are already worried for
their loved ones’ welfare and safety. On top of that, some spend sleepless nights worrying about how to scrape together their family’s biil,
or living expenses. Idil felt that some people were not “living here as
a person” but get “blocked out” about remitting. Refusing insistent or
desperate requests can be painful, as Shamsa, a single mother with
four children, explained:
How many people you used to know, relatives, calling you!…I would
change my phone number every month if I could. But you can’t go to all
those people, the children’s school, your college, the doctor, the Home
Office…It’s not that I don’t want to help. But I can’t!…It is painful to
me…‘I need money, I’m hungry, even the phone call, I don’t know how
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I am going to pay for it, at least send me the money for the phone call.’
It irritates me!…I can’t ignore it, I can’t ignore it, I can’t ignore it…it’s like
you are facing a big wave.42

Third, remitting can be a source of tension among family members
in the U.K. Life in the U.K. is a jolt for many couples. Some urban
women accustomed to having help in the home feel the strain when
they suddenly have to cope with looking after the children and running the household, alongside dealing with other matters, in an unfamiliar, sometimes hostile environment. For some men, immigration
is an emasculating experience as they struggle to find work and reestablish their traditional role as breadwinner. With marital relations
already undergoing complex adjustments, remittances can impose an
added strain. When the wife works she is usually expected to support
her relatives back home herself, but if she is a housewife, she often
wants her husband to help his in-laws as well as his own relatives,
which can cause marital strife. Brothers and sisters overseas sometimes
jostle over shared responsibilities. Intergenerational tensions sometimes arise. Forty percent of remitters lived in households with children under 16, many of whom grew up a long way from their relatives
and sometimes struggle to understand why their parents send money.
In transnational communities, children “have to construct their notion
of a family and its emotional and economic utility more deliberately,
rather than taking it for granted through continuous day-to-day interaction. A family in the absence of regular physical proximity requires
conscious rationalization.”43 While Somali diaspora culture has shown
resistance to erosion from what are seen as Western and individualistic values, there is some “nuclearisation” of families as they bring up
their children in London and elsewhere. Others make special efforts to
bring their children up with a sense of responsibility for relatives in the
Somali regions.
How do people deal with requests for assistance, which clearly can
sometimes weigh heavy on them? While many simply persevere, others adopt various strategies to cope. First, negotiation within family
networks can make remittance commitments more manageable. Of
the respondents, 72% had close family members beyond the Horn of
Africa: people may take turns or each contribute toward a combined
monthly amount. At the other end, the main recipient in Somalia may
channel funds and buffer requests. Another strategy is to keep track of
how much is sent and to whom. While many people find that difficult,
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some feel it is worthwhile in case they need to negotiate or deflect
future requests. This is why Farhiya began collecting her receipts:
They think that I never give them enough…One day if I go there I will
calculate how much I have sent…I will be sitting in their home…it will
come up…Maybe they will realise: either it doesn’t work sending all this
money or…Maybe it will help them to think…I will take the receipts in
the box! I have sent tens of thousands [of dollars], maybe hundreds of
thousands.44

There are also ways to keep tabs on the recipients. It can be difficult
for people to impose conditions on how the money is used, acknowledging their distance from the local situation and fearing a cold
response. Often members of the diaspora are seen, or see themselves,
as xabxab (watermelon) hearts, i.e., soft touches. According to a money
transfer agent in Hargeisa:
The diaspora for example in England, they spoil their families. They
send money without any checking or consulting…No strings attached!
You should…tell your people that you are not earning [money] by sitting
down. You should say, ‘this is the last instalment, you have to do that
job.’ But they are shy, are ashamed to do that.45

However, many respondents discuss with their family members
how much money they need, and send just enough to prevent hardship—a kind of “subsistence ethic.” As we have seen in several cases,
the gossip machine can serve migrants too, relaying information about
how money is spent and identifying potential “worthy” beneficiaries.
Some people refuse to send money for particular types of community
purposes, for example for qadhaan, when they think this will be used to
buy weapons or for purposes that they consider frivolous or unnecessary.
Another strategy to cope with remittance obligations is to help recipients invest in an independent future. Most directly, some save a lump
sum to help recipients establish a small business. (Women sometimes
use hagbaad, the rotating savings system, to do this.) Yet this is not
always feasible, for example, if you cannot save enough or if relatives
are too old or young or live in a particularly insecure area. Alternatively, remitters often sponsor the education of young relatives or help
relatives move to neighbouring countries or further afield. From the
remitters’ point of view this can turn a dependent into someone who
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may be able to help with, or even take over, their remittance responsibilities, lending an internal momentum to the migration-remittance
process.
Finally, some people simply avoid remitting. Consistent refusals
often eventually deter callers. Some evade contact by ignoring early
morning phone calls, avoiding giving their phone number to people
back home, and even changing phone numbers. Pleading one’s own
poverty often fails to convince, but consistent excuses can be effective
in the long term.
In light of these complex repercussions, and the strategies that refugees have developed to deal with requests, the sustainability of the
remittance economy is much debated among the Somali people and
foreign commentators. Sustaining or increasing remittance volume is a
common policy goal of countries with high emigration, and the United
Nations’ Transitional Plan for Somalia in 2007 aimed to increase remittances by 10% in a two-year period as part of the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.46 Given the nature of the remittance process
as described from a diaspora perspective, were such goals desirable or
realistic? It is generally assumed that if migrants do not return home,
remitting will decline over time as they face competing claims on their
income from their growing family in the host country, and social ties
with family back home gradually weaken.47 Yet this hypothesis has
rarely been tested and conflicts with evidence on the growth of “transnational communities.”48 The absence of reliable macro-level and longitudinal data inhibits analysis of the Somali case, but we can identify
several factors that seem likely to shape remittance patterns over the
coming years.
First, the settlement processes and aging of existing overseas communities are likely to influence remittance behaviour. It is interesting
to note that even some of the retired seamen who came to the U.K.
many years ago, and refugees who arrived in the 1980s, are still sending money, suggesting considerable persistence, often despite difficult
circumstances. But the existing diaspora is rather stretched financially
and its members perhaps unlikely to dig deeper into their pockets.
Certain people claim that fatigue is setting in. While there is some
evidence that the “1.5” and second generation are showing interest
in Somalia and being encouraged to maintain connections, it seems
highly unlikely that the remitting will be reproduced at the present
high levels across generations. All in all, it seems likely that remittances from the existing overseas population will gradually decline
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rather than intensify in the future. What might offset this for a period
would be an improvement of employment and income levels among
people of Somali origin in the U.K.
Second, opportunities for new movement will affect both the supply and demand for assistance. While asylum opportunities in the
Global North are narrowing, this may be offset somewhat by ever
riskier forms of clandestine migration, by family reunion and marriage
migration (although the latter can also reduce the candidates for assistance in the home country), and by migration to the Middle East, if
the demand for migrant workers there grows. Changing immigration
regimes may affect the remittance economy. For example, under the
new asylum system in the U.K., people given refugee status are subject
to deportation after five years should circumstances in their country
improve. This threat may encourage them to invest in relationships
and assets back home or generate savings, in case of return.
Third, future political dispensations in the Somali regions will have
critical implications for the supply and demand for assistance. Further
war and instability would seem likely to lead to additional emigration
and “survival remittances.” On the other hand, further stability in the
northern regions may encourage remittances for investment projects
and/or return of expatriates.
V. Beyond Economics: The Violent Origins and
Social Texture of Remitting
This study of the Somali remittance process raises several issues that
would be worth exploring in future studies. First, there is a far more
unsettled relationship between the act of migration and the act of
remitting than is commonly envisaged. People did not migrate in order
to remit, as was envisaged in the dominant model of remittance behaviour. They primarily fled the Somali regions to escape life-threatening
violence. Migration was not part of a careful plan to diversify their
income (indeed, people have often lost important assets in the process of flight) but a more fraught process focused on seeking a place
of safety.49 Yet it seems that even when migration is not specifically
undertaken in order to diversify household income sources, it may
have that effect; remitting represents a post-hoc strategy or an “unforeseen burden.”50
The view from London also demonstrates that as migrants are not
“just labour,” so remittances are not “just money” but an intense form
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of “relational work.”51 They have become, in the Somali case, a major
part of maintaining affectionate social relationships between people
separated by war, distance, and great economic disparities. Understanding the control and transfer of remittances requires careful scrutiny of the social construction of the family and community in specific
cultural and transnational contexts.
The accounts of Somali Londoners suggest that more attention
should be paid to the issues of need and disparities in explaining remittance practices. The North-South divide clearly infuses the everyday
lives of Somali Londoners. People involved in this study repeatedly
emphasised the large disparities between the West, where the bulk of
remittances originate, and Africa, where the bulk of remittances arrive.
Glaring and quantifiable, the material gulf between the host country
and the country of origin has also become almost ritualised, inscribed
in the collective consciousness of those involved. Remitters in the West
can often afford to play a significant role in the livelihoods of recipients in a way that can continue over many years. Given the frequency
of global migration along steep income gradients (as, for example,
between Africa and Europe) as well as the segmentation of labour
markets, which means that migrants often are restricted to poorly paid
work, the issue of disparities (absolute and relative) in shaping the
remittance process merits more attention.
The perspective from the diaspora makes it clear that at the same
time as providing a means to reaffirm relationships with distant loved
ones, remitting can also have substantial costs for migrants, a fact too
often lost in the overwhelming focus of the literature on the impact
of remittances in migrants’ countries of origin. In this sense, refugees’
experiences can offer a particularly clear antidote to transnational
euphoria and offers a rather more troubled view of “globalisation from
below.”52 As Doreen Massey puts it:
Most people actually still live in places like Harlesden or West Brom.
Much of life for many people, even in the heart of the First World, still
consists of waiting in a bus-shelter with your shopping for a bus that
never comes. Hardly a graphic illustration of time-space compression.53

*This article is an edited version of a chapter of Dr. Lindley’s forthcoming book, The Early Morning Phonecall: Somali Refugees’ Remittances, to
be published by Berghahn Books in 2010. An earlier version is published in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
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Notes
1. Note that all names are pseudonyms and some details have been changed to preserve
the anonymity of research participants.
2. GLA 2005.
3. Stark and Lucas 1988.
4. Aragno 2000.
5. Dahabshiil has a broad customer base in the U.K. and allowed the researcher to survey
people sending remittances in one of its London offices. (For practical reasons, thirty
questionnaires were administered in a second, smaller office.) 175 respondents were
randomly sampled. The sample represents 17% of the customers at the outlet during
the month in question. 19% of those initially approached refused to participate, mainly
giving time pressure as a reason, but there was no evidence that this led to the undersampling of people with particular characteristics. Short face-to-face interviews were
conducted by the researcher and an assistant, half in English and half in Somali.
6. Massey 1994, p. 61.
7. Lindley and Van Hear 2007.
8. This is the Labour Force Survey figure, according to Kevin Brennan’s (Parliamentary
Secretary, Cabinet Office) written answer to a question by Michael Fallon, 20 April 2009.
Accessed online on 8 May 2009 at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=200904-20c.269752. This seems a reasonable lower bound estimate when cross-checked with
other sources:
a) 2001 Census recorded 43,373 people living in England and Wales who were
born in Somalia
b) Labour Force Survey 1997 estimated a Somali-born population of 47,000
(Griffiths 2002)
c) Home Office records show around 68,025 Somali nationals were granted settlement in 1985–2007. It is thought that most will have remained in the U.K.
d) None of these sources adequately capture failed asylum-seekers and irregular
migrants, and some would not capture Somali Europeans who have moved to the
U.K., mainly since 2000 (Lindley and Van Hear 2007)
9. Griffiths et al. 2006.
10. GLA 2005.
11. Bloch and Atfield 2002.
12. Hansen 2006; Hammond 2008.
13. Al-Ali et al. 2001.
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14. As the money is transferred in U.S. dollars, respondents found it easier to remember
how much they had sent in dollars. They usually say how much they want to send in
U.S. dollars and then the cashier calculates the cost in pounds (of buying the dollars and
paying commission of around 5%). Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest five. The
$3,000 figure corroborates other estimates (Shire 2006; Lindley forthcoming).
15. This would appear to be relatively high levels of remittances. A large-scale survey
of black and ethnic minority households in the U.K. found that more than one quarter
had remitted money in the previous year, and the remitting households interviewed had
sent an average of £874 (ICM 2006). A survey focusing specifically on low-paid migrant
workers in London found that nearly three quarters had sent money home, an average of
around £100 a month (Datta et al. 2007).
16. This broadly corroborates Shire 2006.
17. While the Census has limitations when it comes to reaching non-English speakers
and inner city, transient, and economically marginalised populations, it remains the
most comprehensive and robust source of data on the Somali-born population.
18. Sahlins 2004, pp. 186–87.
19. Cliggett 2005.
20. Bajic 2007.
21. The survey collected data on 177 people who received money from the respondents
four or more times in the last year, mainly in the Somali regions.
22. Sahlins 2004.
23. Interview with Liban, London, November 2003.
24. Cliggett 2005; Santillán and Ulfe 2006.
25. Interview, money transfer agent, London, June 2002.
26. Interview with Abdirashid, London, May 2005.
27. Sahlins 2004, p. 211.
28. Al-Sharmani 2006; Hansen 2006.
29. See, for example, Al-Ali et al. 2001; Horst 2007; and Riak Akuei 2005.
30. It was deemed too sensitive to collect information on income in the survey.
31. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
32. Interview with Zahra, London, November 2004.
33. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
34. Income support at the time for a single person over 24 years old was £56.20 per week
(£2,922.40 per year). Accessed online on 19 December 2006 at www.rightsnet.org.uk.
35. Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, p. 10.
36. Datta et al. 2007.
37. Ratha 2003.
38. Countries of birth compared were Afghanistan, Angola, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan.
39. Granovetter 1983.
40. Interview with Idil, London, May 2005.
41. See also Horst 2007; Riak Akuei 2005.
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42. Interview with Shamsa, London, May 2005.
43. Bryceson and Vuorela 2002, p. 15.
44. Interview with Farhiya, London, June 2006.
45. Informal consultation, money transfer agent, Hargeisa, November 2007.
46. United Nations 2007.
47. Brown and Poirine 2005.
48. Sana and Massey 2005.
49. While choice of destination was understandably influenced by family, economic, and
status considerations, and as some regions stabilized, the economic rationale for migration became more salient, migration still remains a highly fraught process.
50. Riak Akuei 2005.
51. Zelizer 2005.
52. Black 2001.
53. Massey 1994, p. 163.
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